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Abstract –Evolution is based on the assumption that competing players update their strategies
to increase their individual payoffs. However, while the applied updating method can be different,
most of previous works proposed uniform models where players use identical way to revise their
strategies. In this work we explore how imitation-based or learning attitude and innovation-based
or myopic best response attitude compete for space in a complex model where both attitudes
are available. In the absence of additional cost the best response trait practically dominates the
whole snow-drift game parameter space which is in agreement with the average payoff difference of
basic models. When additional cost is involved then the imitation attitude can gradually invade
the whole parameter space but this transition happens in a highly nontrivial way. However,
the role of competing attitudes is reversed in the stag-hunt parameter space where imitation is
more successful in general. Interestingly, a four-state solution can be observed for the latter
game which is a consequence of an emerging cyclic dominance between possible states. These
phenomena can be understood by analyzing the microscopic invasion processes, which reveals the
unequal propagation velocities of strategies and attitudes.
To imitate a more successful strategy is a frequently
applied microscopic rule within the framework of evolu-
tionary game theoretical models which focus on the funda-
mental conflict of individual and community benefits [1,2].
This assumption is partly motivated by biological systems
where payoff is interpreted as fitness or reproductive suc-
cess [3]. Considering more sophisticated human systems,
where similar social dilemmas are on stage, there are other
alternative suggestions for strategy updating rules that
take account of cognitive skills of competitors. During the
last decades theoretical models have raised several ways
how to update strategies including myopic best response
[4–8], learning, or reinforcement learning strategies [9–17].
In parallel, a huge number of experimental works have
been published, but sometimes their conclusions are con-
flicting which make difficult the comparison with theoret-
ical predictions [18–21].
One of the possible reasons of contradicting experimen-
tal results could be that we cannot be fully sure what
is the microscopic motivation of individual competitors
when they update their strategies. Furthermore the simul-
taneous presence of different updating traits or attitudes
cannot be excluded, which makes the evaluation of dif-
ferent external conditions even harder. Interestingly, this
fact has been largely ignored by theoretical works because
most of them assume uniform players in the sense that
they all apply the same method or attitude to revise their
present states. In this letter we consider a simple model
where two conceptually different attitudes are available
for individuals who try to reach a higher payoff. These
strategy updating methods are based on imitation or in-
novation and players are using one of them during a micro-
scopic step. Beside heterogeneous attitudes we also extend
the basic models by considering the fact that applying a
certain attitude may be costly. For example, innovation
requires additional investment from a player or imitation
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assumes a permanent effort to monitor others’ activity and
score their success. These effects can be modeled by con-
sidering an additional cost to a specific attitude [22–26].
As we will show, even a very simple model can provide
highly complex behavior and the viability of a certain atti-
tude or strategy updating method depends sensitively on
the model parameters. Furthermore, their relation may
change repeatedly by varying only a single parameter, but
without changing the original character of a certain social
dilemma.
We consider pairwise social games where mutual coop-
eration provides the reward R = 1, mutual defection leads
to punishment P = 0. The remaining two payoff values
are free parameters of our model to navigate among differ-
ent dilemma situations. These are the sucker’s payoff S of
a cooperator against a defector and the temptation value
T for the latter player. For simplicity we assume that
players are distributed on a square lattice with periodic
boundaries where every player interacts with four nearest
neighbors when total payoff is calculated. Nevertheless,
we stress that our main findings remain unchanged if we
use different interaction topologies including triangle and
hexagonal lattices or random network.
In addition to the mentioned C and D strategies players
are also characterized by a special attitude or trait which
determines how they revise their strategies. If a player x is
described by the trait imitation (IM) then she adopts the
strategy sy from a neighboring y player with a probability
W (sx → sy) = (1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K])−1 , (1)
where Π denotes the accumulated payoff values gained
from two-player games with nearest neighbors. This sum
is reduced by an attitude-specific cost of focal player. In
particular, an imitating player bears an additional IM
cost, while a player who uses (myopic) best response (BR)
to update her strategy should bear BR. The remaining
parameter K determines the noise level of imitation pro-
cess. In the alternative case, when the x player’s attitude
is characterized by (myopic) best response to update her
strategy, then she changes her sx strategy to s
′
x with a
probability
Γ(sx → s′x) = (1 + exp[(Πx −Π′x)/K])−1 , (2)
where Πx and Π
′
x are the income of player x when playing
sx and s
′
x for the given neighborhood. For simplicity we
applied the same noise level as for the above described
imitation process.
Since our principal interest to explore how different atti-
tudes compete we also allow individual attitude to change.
When this microscopic process is executed, which is inde-
pendent from the previously specified strategy update, we
assume that a player y forces her attitude or individual
trait upon a neighboring player x with the probability
defined by Eq. 1. Technically we thus have a four-state
model, where strategy and individual attitude coevolve
during the evolutionary process.
Fig. 1: Border lines on T − S plane of snow-drift game sep-
arating the regions where either imitation (IM) or best re-
sponse (BR) attitude dominates. Panel (a) shows the borders
calculated from the payoff differences of basic models where
either imitation or best response strategy update is used ex-
clusively. Panel (b) denotes the phase boundaries resulted from
the complex model where both attitudes are present in the ini-
tial states. BR = IM = 0 are used for both panels. The
applied K noise levels are denoted in the legend.
We have performed Monte Carlo simulations and mon-
itored the fractions of strategies and attitudes. If players’
attitudes reached a uniform state we terminated the sim-
ulation because the system become equivalent to a basic
model where either imitation or best response rule is used
exclusively to update individual strategies [7]. Similarly, if
strategy distribution becomes uniform because either C or
D strategy goes extinct then we also stopped simulation.
In the latter case further evolution becomes uninteresting
because in the absence of different strategies the compe-
tition of attitudes is determined by their additional costs
or, if these are equal, the dynamics resembles to the voter-
model like dynamics [27, 28]. This explains why we only
consider snow-drift and stag-hunt games and leave pris-
oner’s dilemma game out. Namely, in the latter case the
system practically terminates onto a full defection state
and this destination can only be avoided if we assume ad-
ditional mechanisms [29–31]. But the scope of present
work is to explore the possible consequence of simulta-
neous attitudes hence we keep the original basic model
without considering further mechanisms.
First we summarize our observations obtained for snow-
drift game when no additional costs of attitudes are con-
sidered. Figure 1(b) highlights that if the T value is close
to 1, which means that the temptation to defect is small,
then the imitation attitude will spread in the whole sys-
tem during the coevolutionary process. But for high T
temptation values the evolutionary outcome is reversed
and the best response attitude crowds out the alterna-
tive trait. This observation is in close agreement with
the prediction based on the comparison of average pay-
off values of basic models where only uniform attitude is
applied. This comparison is plotted in Fig. 1(a) where
higher payoff can be reached by applying imitation dy-
namics at low T values, but best response attitude offers
a higher general payoff for individuals when we increase
p-2
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Fig. 2: Efficiency of microscopic invasion processes between
different states in dependence on S at fixed T = 1.1 for K =
0.1 when no additional costs are considered (IM = BR =
0). Only those steps are shown which modify the fractions
of competing attitudes. The borders of different phases are
marked by dashed vertical lines. While panel (a) shows the
details of specific elementary invasions as described by legend,
panel (b) shows their accumulated values which determine the
final outcome of competition. For better clarity we have used
I for IM and B for BR players in the legend where elementary
invasion processes are specified.
the temptation value. Interestingly, the payoff difference
is practically independent of the applied noise value, but
the latter has a significant impact on the phase bound-
ary when attitudes properly compete. As Fig. 1(b) shows
the higher the noise value the smaller the parameter space
where imitation can dominate. This phenomenon can be
understood if we consider that the error in imitation will
always destroy the efficiency of homogeneous cooperator
domains, while this error has no real impact on the role-
separating arrangement of C−D pairs when best-response
attitude is at work.
Figure 1(b) also shows that there is a reentrant phase
transition from BR to IM to BR phase as we increase S
value at specific fixed T values. This behavior is a straight-
forward consequence of the relation of cooperator players
having different attitudes. At high S the payoff of a coop-
erator using best response becomes competitive with the
payoff of defectors hence the former BC player can resist
the invasion of imitation attitude. Similarly, small posi-
tive S value also provides a stable support to BC players
to maintain the checkerboard-like pattern of best response
phase. They can resist the invasion of IC imitator cooper-
ators whose low density in IM phase makes them vulner-
able. Between these extreme cases the relatively high S
provides a competitive payoff for IC players whose higher
density makes the whole IM phase strong. To confirm
this argument in Fig. 2(a) we have plotted the differences
of elementary invasion steps for all cases where players in-
vade a neighboring site that was occupied previously by
a different attitude. This panel shows clearly the non-
monotonous change between IC and BC states which is
mainly responsible for the observed reentrant transition.
From Fig. 1(b) we can conclude that best response
attitude can practically dominate the majority of snow-
Fig. 3: Phase diagrams on T − S plane for different cost
values of best response update rule while the cost of imita-
tion strategy update remained IM = 0. The former cost is
BR = 0, 0.05, 0.1, and 0.25 for panel (a) to panel (d) respec-
tively. Here orange (green) denotes the parameter area where
imitation (myopic best response) attitude prevails as a result
of the coevolutionary process. The noise value is K = 0.1 for
all cases.
drift quadrant because the emerging role-separating pat-
tern makes it viable. One may expect that if we increase
the BR cost of this attitude then imitation attitude can
gradually invade the whole parameter space. This expec-
tation is justified but in a highly non-trivial way. Fig-
ure 3 illustrates that the area of IM phase expands as
BR is increased but the shape of phase separating border
could be tangled at intermediate cost values. For example,
at BR = 0.1, S = 0.8 we can observe three consecutive
phase transitions from IM → BR→ IM → BR phase by
changing only the value of temptation T .
In the latter case the explanation of these transitions is
more subtle because it cannot be confirmed by compar-
ing only a single pair of competing states. As earlier, in
Fig. 4 we have recorded the successful elementary inva-
sion steps at three representative S values in dependence
on T . The explanation of three transitions at high S value,
shown in top row, is the following. If we start increasing
temptation from T = 1 then ID becomes more powerful
and simultaneously IC weakens. At the same time BC re-
mains intact in the BR domain because S remains high.
As a result, IC weakens against BC which involves the de-
cay of IM phase against BR phase. Indeed, ID becomes
also stronger against BC , but the former effect is more
substantial, as Fig. 4(b) panel illustrates. Increasing T
further the average cooperation level does not change rel-
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evantly. (This plateau was illustrated in Fig. 4(c) of Ref.
[7] where the basic IM model was studied.) However, the
further increase of T makes ID even powerful. As a result,
ID can invade BC more intensively, which will reverse the
direction of propagation between BR and IM phases. The
last transition can be explained by the relation of BD and
ID players, which becomes important for this parameter
region. While the former remains fit among BC players
the latter cannot utilize high T because the density of IC
players decays rapidly. This is why BD will beat ID more
frequently which causes the victory of BR phase again.
At intermediate S value, shown in middle row of Fig. 4,
the previously mentioned plateau of the basic IM model
disappears, hence ID players are unable to utilize the con-
stant support of IC neighbors. Consequently, we can ob-
serve only a single transition from IM to BR phase. At
smaller S value, however, we face a new situation be-
cause small S cannot maintain IC players in IM phase
for higher T values. This is illustrated by the invasion
rates shown in the bottom row of Fig. 4 where the in-
vasion success of BC against IC diminishes for T > 1.5.
Here BC cannot beat IC players anymore and the advan-
tage of BR phase over IM solution disappears. Instead,
a pure ID phase competes with the previously mentioned
checkerboard-like pattern of BR phase. Here ID players
can utilize their advantage over BD players who have to
bear the extra BR = 0.1 cost. As a result, IM phase
strikes back when temptation exceeds T = 1.5 value. As
we increase T further, the disadvantage of additional cost
becomes marginal and the stable support of BC neighbors
will provide a competitive payoff for BD players, which
explains why BR phase can win again.
The comparative plots of Fig. 5 provide a deeper insight
into the consecutive phase transitions as we increase the
temptation value. Here we first separated the lattice into
two parts where the solutions of basic models evolved in-
dependently due to the applied parameter values. More
precisely, players using best response attitude were closed
in the central domain where this subsystem relaxed to the
BR phase, while players using imitation attitude were in
the surrounding space where IM phase evolved. In other
words, neither strategy nor attitude transfer was allowed
across the separating borders which are marked by dashed
white lines. These final states of the relaxation, which are
the initial states of attitude competitions, are plotted in
the top row of Fig.5. After we removed the borders, the
starting strategy and attitude transfer resulted in a com-
plete success of one of the basic solutions. We note that
the final states are not shown here, but can be read out
from the top row of Fig.4. Instead, we have recorded the
”trace” of invasion steps for every cases. More precisely
in the bottom row of Fig. 5 we colored those lattice sites
where invasion happened during the whole competition
until sole IM or BR state was reached. The applied col-
ors, which are plotted in the bottom of the Figure, mark
the last invasion process at a given position.
Figure 5(a) demonstrates that at small T value the IM
Fig. 4: The success of elementary invasion steps between com-
peting attitudes for different values of fixed S in dependence on
temptation T . Top row shows the results for S = 0.8, middle
row for S = 0.5, and bottom row for S = 0.2. As for Fig. 2, left
column shows the full details of invasion, while right column
summarizes their impacts on the direction of invasion between
competing solutions. As earlier, the critical T values of phase
transition points are marked by dashed vertical lines. Other
parameters are K = 0.1, BR = 0.1, and IM = 0.
state is full of IC players who can support each other ef-
fectively and collect high payoff value. As a consequence,
IM phase can easily invade BR phase at this parameter
region. The corresponding Fig. 5(e) illustrates that in this
case the most typical change between the competing states
is when the previously mention strong IC player invades
the weaker member of BR phase, which is BC player. As
we increase temptation value, shown in Fig. 5(b), the den-
sity of IC players decays which weakens them significantly.
At the same time ID cannot gain enough power because
the T value is still moderate. As a result, the direction of
invasion turns back and BR starts propagating. Indeed,
the related Fig. 5(f) demonstrates that the BD → ID and
BD → IC transitions become dominant. As we already
noted, by increasing T further the density of IC players
does not change relevantly due to the high value of S.
This is clearly visible in Fig. 5(c), where IM phase be-
fore the competition remained practically unchanged. It
means that ID players can enjoy undisturbed support from
IC neighbors but the former is already armed by a higher
p-4
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Fig. 5: Competition of attitudes for different temptation values for T = 1.15, 1.45, 1.7, and 1.9 (from left to right). The other
parameters, S = 0.8, IM = 0, BR = 0.1,K = 0.1 and L = 80, are fixed for all cases. Top row shows the initial separation of
lattice where the composition of best response players are surrounded by players who apply imitation-based strategy update rule.
First invasion across the vertical phase separating lines are forbidden hence subsystem solutions are relaxed to the characteristic
states which are determined by T, S, and K values. When competition starts by removing the border between them then either
IM or BR phase prevails depending on the T value (not shown). Bottom row illustrates the trace of elementary processes
during the invasion. To distinguish them we used the same color coding as for Fig. 2 and Fig. 4.
T payoff. That explains why the IM phase can invade
again because the ID → BC transition, marked by light
orange, becomes relevant. Lastly, if we increase tempta-
tion value T further then ID becomes too successful within
IM phase, hence the density of IC players decays drasti-
cally, as it is shown in Fig. 5(d). Consequently, ID players
are unable to enjoy the support of neighboring IC players
when they fight against the external BR phase. BD play-
ers of the latter phase, however, can still enjoy the solid
support of BC neighbors due to the checkerboard-like pat-
ter of this phase. That explains why BD players can beat
ID players, and BD phase invades IM phase no mater the
former attitude should still bear an extra cost. This phe-
nomenon is nicely illustrated in Fig. 5(h) where dark green
pixels emerged more frequently. To summarize the sur-
prisingly different outcomes of evolution processes we have
provided an animation [32], where all discussed cases are
shown simultaneously using the same S = 0.8, BR = 0.1
values and the only difference is the temptation value as
it is described by Fig. 5.
In the rest of this work we present our observations ob-
tained for stag hunt game, where R > T > P > S rank
characterizes the dilemma. The most fundamental differ-
ence from the above discussed snow-drift dilemma is best
response attitude cannot provide a checkerboard-like pat-
tern here, hence homogeneous solutions compete for space
[8]. In this situation imitation is more effective when both
attitudes are free from additional cost, because IM atti-
tude can extend full C state to a larger area on T − S
plane. This is illustrated in Fig. 6(a), where we plotted
the phase diagram using IM = BR = 0 cost values at
K = 0.1. If T is too small then defectors die out very
early and both basic models terminate into a full coopera-
tor state. Increasing T best response attitude does better
and invades the whole space. This state is marked by IM ,
but we note that full cooperator state is still maintained.
Increasing temptation further there is a sharp transition
into the full D state that is in agreement with the basic
models where uniform attitudes are assumed [7].
The invasion of IM phase into the BR phase reveals
an interesting phenomenon that is based on the unequal
propagation speeds of strategy and attitude. To illustrate
it in Fig. 6(c) we start the evolution from an initial state
where two stable solutions of basic models are present at
T = 0.35, S = −0.7. More precisely BD players, who are
in the middle of this panel are fighting against IC players
who surround them. When evolution starts BD players
at the frontier change their attitude first and become ID
players. This new state, which is not present in the initial
state, is marked by dark red color in Fig. 6(d). The whole
propagation process can be followed in an animation we
provided as supplementary information [33]. It is impor-
tant to note that this new state has a special role on the
propagation of IC players. On one hand, ID cannot be
p-5
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utilized by MD players, but on the other hand the former
could be more successful than the latter since they enjoy
the vicinity of IC players. This explains why ID (dark
red) propagates in the sea of BD (light red). Interest-
ingly, the triumph of ID is just temporary because they
immediately are invaded by IC players. The latter process
ensures a thin protecting skin around IC domain in a self-
regulating way. Put differently, ID helps IC to invade BR
phase and after, fulfilling its job, ID goes extinct. This is
the so-called ”the Moor has done his duty, the Moor may
go” effect which was previously observed in a completely
different system where punishing strategies were involved
in a public goods game [34].
Naturally, if we apply a significant cost for imitation at-
titude then it looses its advantage and players using best
response attitude will dominate. As a result, the area of
full C state shrinks on the T−S plane and its border shifts
to the S = T −1 line in the zero noise limit, which charac-
terizes the BR basic model. Interestingly, a moderate IM
cost allows a new kind of solution to emerge. To illustrate
it we present a phase diagram plotted in Fig. 6(b) where
IM = 0.02 was applied. This diagram suggests that at
some parameter values all competing states can survive
and coexist. This coexistence is based on a cyclic dom-
inance between microscopic states and a typical spatial
pattern is plotted in Fig. 6(e). As the pattern suggests
IC (dark blue) invades BD (light red) with the help of
ID (dark red) players. Here the role of ID is the same
as we described above. However, BC (light blue) invades
IC (dark blue) because the former should bear an extra
cost. Lastly, BD (light red) invades BC (light blue) be-
cause the best response basic model dictates a full D state
at this T − S parameter values. For clarity we also pro-
vided an animation where the dynamics of this states can
be followed [35].
The above description of cyclic dominance explains why
we cannot observe coexistence for too high IM values. In
the latter case the vicinity of IC cannot compensate the
high cost value of ID, hence ID cannot invade BD domain
anymore. As a result, the cyclic chain of invasions is bro-
ken and system terminates into a state where the popula-
tion is described by a homogeneous state. This behavior is
in close agreement with our general understanding about
the positive role of cyclic dominance to maintain diversity
of microscopic states [36–45].
To sum up, we have shown that the success of differ-
ent strategy updating traits or attitudes may depend sen-
sitively on the actual payoff values which characterize a
social dilemma. In most of the parameter regions we de-
tected homogeneous populations but we can observe sev-
eral transitions between an imitation dominant state to a
population which is described by best response attitude.
Our key finding is attitudes and strategies may propagate
with different speeds which makes it possible for several in-
teresting pattern formation to emerge. For example, con-
secutive re-entrant phase transitions are detected by only
changing a single parameter without modifying the funda-
Fig. 6: Panel (a): phase diagram on T −S plane of stag-hunt
game for BR = IM = 0 at K = 0.1. C (D) denotes the phase
where defectors (cooperators) die out very early. When IM im-
itation attitude prevails, the system evolves into a full coopera-
tor state. Panel (b) shows the phase diagram when IM = 0.02
is applied for imitation attitude. Here CY C denotes a solu-
tion where all available states coexist due to cyclic dominance.
Panel (c) shows the initial state of competition when stable
solutions of basic models (full IC and full BD) start compet-
ing at T = 0.35, S = −0.7, and IM = BR = 0. Panel (d)
illustrates a representative intermediate state of invasion be-
fore imitation attitude invades the whole system. During the
invasion a new state, ID, emerges which highlights the unequal
invasion speeds of attitude and strategy. Panel (e) illustrates
the cyclic dominance between IC → BD → BC → IC states
at T = 0.7, S = −0.5, and IM = 0.02. The color codes of
microscopic states are identical to those we used in top row of
Fig. 5.
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mental character of a social dilemma. We have also shown
that cyclic dominance can emerge between microscopic
states no matter there are only two major C and D strate-
gies. Indeed, it was previously found that a two-strategy
system can produce similar cyclic dominance in spatial
systems [46], but the mentioned example assumed diverse
timescales during the evolution. Our present observations
emphasize that the microscopic origin of diversity has just
a second-order importance because every type of micro-
scopical diversity could be a source of cyclical dominance
among competing states.
We note that all the presented results are robust to re-
placing lattice-type interaction topology by random graph,
and can be observed also for other parameter values. We
conclude that considering simultaneous presence of differ-
ent strategy updating or learning attitudes might be a
new research avenue for modeling human behavior in so-
cial dilemmas more realistically.
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